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TIIE END OF THINKING
by Giorgio Agamben
It happens much as when, walking through the woods, we are suddenly struck by the unheard variety of animal voices: trills, whistles,
and gurglings; knells as of wood or metal splinters; chirps, whirrs,
and whispers: springing immediately from him, each animal his own
proper voice. In the end, the cuckoo's double note mocks our silence
and reveals the untenability of our being, unique, voiceless amidst the
boundless chorus of animal voices. Only then do we attempt to speak,
to think.
In our tongue, the word thinking bears originally the meaning of
anguish, of burning anxiety, as can still be found in the familiar
expression "stare in pensiero," to be thoughtful, to worry. The Latin
verb pendere, from which the word is derived in the Romance languages, means "to be suspended." St. Augustine employs it in this
sense in order to characterize the learning process: "The desire
inherent in research ushers from the seeker and, somehow suspended
[pendet quodammodo1 doesn't rest in the end it seeks but when the
seeker and what is sought find each other in unity."
What is it that is suspended, what "hangs" in thinking? We can think,
in language, solely because language is and is not our voice. There's a
pending, an unresolved question in language, and that is, whether
language is or is not our voice, the way braying is properly the voice of
a donkey and chirping that of a cricket. That is why, when we speak,
we can't do without thinking, without keeping the words suspended.
Thinking is the pending of the voice in language.
(Obviously the cricket cannot think while chirping)
When in the evening we walk through the woods, at every step we
hear the rustling of invisible animals amidst the bushes that line the
path, knowing not whether they are lizards or porcupines, thrushes or
snakes. The same happens when we think: what counts is not the path
of the words we are traveling, but the indistinct toddling we hear
occasionally moving by the edges, a fleeing animal or something
suddenly aroused by the noise of our footsteps.
The fleeing animal, we've been told, the fleeing rustle we feel through
the words, is our voice. We think - we hold the words suspended and
ourselves hanging in language - we think because ultimately we
hope to find the voice there, in language. Once, we've been told, the
voice wrote itself into language. The quest of the voice in language is
called thinking.
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That language surprise and ever anticipate the voice; that the pending of the voice in language have no end: this is the problem in
philosophy. (How each one resolves this slant is called ethics.)
But the voice, the human voice is not: there is no such thing called our
voice that we can follow in the traces of language, enabling us to
gather-so as to remember it-the moment it vanishes into names, the
moment it inscribes itself in letters. We speak with the voice we don't
have, the voice that was never written (Antigone, 454). And language
is always like "dead letter."
Thinking: we can think only if language is not our voice, only if we
fathom the bottom of our voicelessness. But in truth, there's no bottom.
Such an abyss is what we call the world.
Logic shows that language is not my voice. It says moreover that the
voice, though it has been, is no longer, nor can it ever be. Language
takes place in the non-place of the voice. Which means that, concerning the voice, thinking has nothing to say. This we may call its piety.
So then the fleeing, the pending of the voice in language must come to
an end. We can finally stop holding language, and the voice, in a
suspended state. If the voice has never been, if thinking is the thinking
of the voice, then it has nothing to think about. A thought which is
fulfilled, in other words, has no thoughts left to think.

Of the Latin verb that, for centuries, indicated thinking, cogitare,
scarcely a trace remains in our language, in the word tracotanza,
haughtiness, arrogance. In the XIV Century, coto, cuitanza meant:
THINKING. Tracotanza stems, by way of the Provem;al oltracuidansa,
from the Latin *ultracogitare: to exceed, to go beyond the limit of
thinking, overthinking, dis-thinking.
What has been said can once again be said. But what has been thought
cannot ever be said again. One takes leave of a thought word for ever.
We walk through the woods; suddenly, we hear a whirring of wings or
displaced grass. A hen-pheasant flies up and we can barely see it
disappear amidst the boughs, a porcupine delves deeper into the thick
of the brush, parched leaves creak and crumble under the sliding
serpent. Thinking is not the encounter with, but the flight from invisible animals. No, it wasn't our voice: we drew as near to language as
possible, we almost skimmed it, held it suspended: but our meeting
did not take place, and we must now turn away, thoughtless, toward
home.
Then does language become our voice, our language. The way you are
speaking now, this is what we call ethics.
[English version by Peter Carravetta]

